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Prior Agreements in International Clinical Trials: Ensuring
the Benefits of Research to Developing Countries
Alice K. Page, J.D., M.P.H.*
When biomedical research is conducted in the developing world, the
disparity in power between rich and poor nations manifests itself in two
ways. In most cases, the industrialized world sets the agenda and carries out
the research. The involvement of developing countries is limited (a
gradual change, however, is evident), and only in a few instances do they
function as full and equal partners.' Moreover, although it assumes very
few research burdens, the industrialized world receives the great
majority-and in some cases, all-of the research benefits because, unlike
the developing world, it can afford to buy a proven intervention. The
burdens of research, in contrast, are borne by developing countries whose
poorest inhabitants serve as research subjects but rarely share in its
benefits. Many interventions are well beyond the economic reach of both
research subjects and their governments.2
* Alice K Page works on research ethics-related matters in the Office of Research and
Graduate Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School.
f This Article was originally prepared by the author as a commissioned paper for the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Substantial portions were adopted by
NBAC and appear in either an identical or similar form in its report, Ethical and Policy Issues
in International Collaborative Research: Clinical Trials in the Developing World. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and may not reflect those of NBAC. Prior to its
acceptance for publication in the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, this Article was
the subject of a presentation at the Columbia University Seminar on Human Rights in
December 2001. An edited version of this Article will appear in a volume tentatively entitled
Looking Beyond the State: Non-State Actors and Human Rights, to be edited by the organizers of
the Columbia University Seminar.
1 I NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2001) [hereinafter 1 NBAC];
NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO HEALTHCARE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24-30 (2002).
' This discussion is grounded in distributive justice, an ethical principle that seeks a fair and
equitable distribution of social benefits and burdens. In the research context, distributive
justice demands that no one group or class of persons assumes the risks and inconveniences
of research if that group or class is unlikely to benefit from the fruits of that research. This
concept extends to international collaborative research, which involves an arrangement
between researchers and sponsors from industrialized and developing countries and their
local institutions, but not necessarily the countries themselves, (although the Ministry of
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Under these circumstances, for the research to be ethical, research
benefits must be fairly and equitably apportioned to the host community,
3
a term which may be difficult to define in a particular research setting.
One of the greatest challenges facing international research ethics is
crafting practical and economically feasible solutions to help ensure that
citizens of developing countries are not exploited for the benefit of the
industrialized world. Data from a survey conducted for the benefit of the
United States National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) indicate
that, to some extent, post-trial availability of research benefits is a
consideration in research hosted by developing countries. Nevertheless,
forty-eight percent of researchers in developing countries and thirty-three
percent of U.S. researchers who responded believed that the interventions
tested in their research were unlikely to become available to most host
community residents in the foreseeable future.
This Article examines the use of prior agreements in international
clinical trials6 to ensure provision of drugs and other research benefits to
developing countries where research is conducted. Post-trial access to the
Health usually must grant approval for the research). See 1 ANNA MASTROIANNI ET AL.,
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN
CLINICAL STUDIES 78 (Anna Mastroianni et al. eds., 1994) ("[J]ustice is to be construed as a
universal requirement, not confined within the borders of any one nation."). As Ruth
Macklin writes:
To meet the requirements of distributive justice in international research ...
[b]eneficiaries of the research outcomes must include people in the developing
countries where research is conducted, as well as the developed country that
sponsors the research. These conditions make it clear that it is not only the
benefits and burdens accruing to the research participants, but also the
potentially beneficial outcomes of the research that count in determining equity.
Ruth Macklin, Justice in International Research, in BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN
RESEARCH 132 (Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds., 1998). See also 1 MASTROANNI ET AL., supra (noting
that in its discussion of distributive justice, the report issued by the Institute of Medicine
states that "[bleneficiaries of the research outcomes must include people in the developing
countries where the research is conducted, as well as in the [developed country that
sponsors the research]"); Solomon R. Benatar, Distributive Justice and Clinical Trials in the
Third World, 22 THEORETICAL MED. 169, 169-76 (2001); D.R. Cooley, Distributive Justice and
Clinical Trials in the Third World, 22 THEORETICAL MED. 151, 151-67 (2001).
"Host community," "host population," and "host country" are terms that are often used
interchangeably.
' NANCY KASS & ADNAN A. HYDER, ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES OF U.S. AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRY INVESTIGATORS REGARDING U.S. HUMAN SUBJECTS REGULATIONS B-141 (2000). This
background paper was prepared for NBAC and is available in Volume II of its report, Ethical
and Policy Issues in International Research: Clinical Trials in Developing Countries.
KASS & HYDER, supra note 4, at B-141.
Primarily Phase III clinical trials that directly demonstrate the effectiveness of a new
intervention to a statistically and clinically significant degree were examined. Determining
when this type of clinical trial has occurred is no simple matter.
111:1 (2002)
2
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol3/iss1/2
PRIOR AGREEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH
benefits of research is an issue that has not yet had the benefit of careful
study and public discussion. Other than the World Health Organization
(WIHO), which for years has been using prior agreements in its
collaborations with industry to promote development of health-related
products, agreements for making research benefits available to host
countries after a study is completed have only recently begun to surface in
international clinical trials. Consequently, the number of agreements in
place today is limited.
Two closely related assumptions guide the discussion. First, to be
ethically acceptable, clinical research conducted or sponsored by an
industrialized country7 in a developing country should be responsive to the
health needs and priorities of the population on which it is carried out.8 In
other words, research should aim to improve the health of the population
from which subjects are drawn. Second, there is an ethical obligation to
ensure that the developing country, and not just the individual research
participants, benefits from the research.9 This obligation can be
characterized as a means of applying or implementing the first premise.
Unless there is a reasonable likelihood that developing countries will
partake in the fruits of research in a timely manner, research cannot be
responsive to the needs of the subject population or be expected to
improve its health.' ° However, there may be instances where provision of
research benefits other than (or in addition to) effective interventions is
warranted."
' The term "industrialized country" can include a government agency, pharmaceutical
company, university, non-governmental organization (NGO), or any other entity or
organization, public or private, and the individuals who represent them.
8 COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. Scis., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS Guideline 10 (2002) [hereinafter
CIOMS] ("Before undertaking research in a population or community with limited
resources, the sponsor and the investigator must make every effort to ensure that ... the
research is responsive to the health needs and the priorities of the population or
community in which it is to be carried out....").
' WORLD MED. ASS'N, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS Principle 19 (adopted 1964,
revised 2000) [hereinafter WMA] ("Medical research is onlyjustified if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the populations in which the research is carried out stand to benefit from
the results of the research."); Robert A. Crouch &John D. Arras, AZT Trials and Tribulations,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1998, at 26, 26; Leonard H. Glantz et al., Research in Developing
Countries: Taking 'Benefit' Seriously, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 1998, at 38, 40.
'0 CIOMS, supra note 8, Guideline 10 ("Before undertaking research in a population or
community with limited resources, the sponsor and the investigator must make every effort
to ensure that ... any intervention or product developed, or knowledge generated, will be
made reasonably available for the benefit of that population or community.").
" See infra Part I.
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The Article is divided into three parts. Part I explains what prior
agreements are and how they are being used in international clinical trials.
Part II urges the use of prior agreements to help overcome some of the
barriers to making effective interventions available in developing
countries. It also refutes current arguments against the use of prior
agreements. Part III discusses the various types of prior agreements
currently in use and offers concluding observations.
I. How PRIOR AGREEMENTS CAN BE USED To MAKE RESEARCH BENEFITS
AVAILABLE
"Prior agreements," also known as "community benefit agreements,"
generally refer to arrangements made before research begins that lay out a
realistic plan for making effective interventions or other research benefits
available to the host community after a study is completed. The use of the
term "agreement" generally does not have any legal connotation in the
international research context, and while some of these agreements may
be legally binding instruments, others are not. In the area of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) vaccine trials, for example, "[p]revious
experience indicates that manufacturers usually agree verbally to explore
alternatives to make products available, but they rarely do so in writing."2
It is difficult to formulate general rules regarding the nature and scope
of prior agreements. Every study conducted is unique, and the needs and
circumstances of developing countries vary so greatly and often change
and evolve over time. The parties to these agreements usually include some
combination of producers, research sponsors, and potential users of
effective interventions or other research benefits. Industry, academia, and
organizations of various kinds are frequently producers and sponsors,
while non-profit health organizations and governments of developing
countries are most likely to be users.
The role of researchers in the prior agreement process warrants some
discussion. Since researchers are not directly responsible for providing
effective interventions to host communities (they neither control research
funds nor set policy), in some, if not many, instances, they are not parties
to these agreements. Researchers from both industrialized and developing
countries still play an important role, however, in ensuring that issues
pertaining to post-trial obligations are fully considered as part of protocol
development and review. It is also essential that, throughout a study and
for some time afterward, researchers maintain an ongoing dialogue about
12 Jose Esparza, AIDS Vaccine Research in Asia: Needs and Opportunities, Report from a
UNA1DS/WHO/NIID Meeting, Tokyo, 28-30 October 1998, 13 AIDS 1, 10 (1999).
111: 1 (2002)
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these issues with national and community health officials as well as with
sponsors of both the study and / or post-trial benefits. Their commitment
to research as well as their knowledge and expertise about the health
problem they are studying place researchers in a unique position to
advocate for the use of an intervention in the host community after a study
is completed. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics, in its recent report, The
Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries, notes:
[T] he researcher should present findings in such a way that healthcare
policy-makers can understand their implications and, at the least, the
findings can be used for advocacy purposes with respect to the future
provision of the intervention .... [T]hey can draw attention to problems
which have been neglected, or conditions whose impact has been
underestimated, and demonstrate that there are feasible solutions.
1 3
Important questions related to representation of the study population
in the negotiation process also need to be addressed. Who should serve as
the representative and how is that determined? What authority does that
party have to serve in that capacity? How is the acceptability of a prior
agreement to the study population to be determined? In one sense, as
advocates for the use of a study intervention in the host community after a
trial is completed, researchers serve as representatives for the study
population. Yet, in almost all cases, the study population will also be
represented by a governmental unit (or units) of some kind, which has
given permission for the study to be conducted. Generally, it will be a
ministry of health at the national level; often, a local governmental body
will be involved as well. However, unless these governmental units are both
willing and able to take action, effective interventions are unlikely to be
made widely available in a host community. Because of resource scarcity,
priority setting by developing countries is extremely difficult, and without
external funding, many countries would be unable to make interventions
available after a study is completed.
In at least two ways, prior agreements can provide research benefits to
populations from which study participants are drawn. One way is to
stipulate that an intervention, if proven effective, will be made available to
the host community at a cost it can afford. This could be accomplished by
providing the intervention to the class of individuals represented by the
trial participants for a specified period of time at a specified cost. Exactly
what this would entail in a given situation depends upon a number of
factors, particularly the health problem that an intervention is intended to
" NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 122.
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address. Alternatively, if a country's need for a particular drug can be
adequately quantified and the shelf life of the drug and other factors
render it appropriate to do so, the country could make bulk purchases of
the drug at a subsidized price.
Prior agreements can also provide derivative benefits-research
benefits other than the studied intervention. The first meeting of the
Global Forum for Bioethics in Research in 199914 reached the consensus
that researchers, sponsors, and host governments should seek
arrangements that emphasize derivative benefits such as technology
transfer and capacity building, rather than simply making effective
interventions available.5 Similarly, the Nepal Health Research Council's
recently published research ethics guidelines state that sponsors "should
consider means in which the research capability of Nepal can be
strengthened... ,,16
Derivative benefits can come in many forms. With technology transfer,
a pharmaceutical company could agree to grant host governments a free
or low-cost license to produce a drug in exchange for a commitment from
those governments to manufacture and distribute the drug to their
constituents. Capacity building asks researchers and sponsors to help
develop a host country's capacity for designing and conducting clinical
trials, for scientific and ethical review of proposed research, and for
implementing research results after a trial is completed. These efforts,
which find support in documents such as the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) International Guidelines for
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 7 and the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV / AIDS (UNAIDS) Guidance Document, Ethical
14 Karen Hofman, The Global Forum for Bioethics in Research: Report of a Meeting, November 1999,
28J. L., MED. & ETHICS 174, 174 (2000) ("Held in Bethesda (Maryland) on November 7-10,
1999, the intent was to bring together individuals involved in medical research in low- and
middle-income nations to share views with each other and with organisations that support
clinical research.").
5 Id. at 175.
6 NEPAL HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH RESEARCH
IN NEPAL §7(d), at 9 (2002).
7 CIOMS, supra note 8, Guideline 20 ("In externally sponsored collaborative research,
sponsors and investigators have an ethical obligation to ensure that biomedical research
projects for which they are responsible in such countries contribute effectively to national
or local capacity to design and conduct biomedical research, and to provide scientific and
ethical review and monitoring of such research. Capacity-building may include, but is not
limited to . . .establishing and strengthening independent and competent ethical review
processes / committees, strengthening research capacity, developing technologies
appropriate to health-care and biomedical research, training of research and health-care
staff, [and] educating the community from which research subjects will be drawn.").
111:1 (2002)
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Considerations in HIV Preventive Vaccine Research,"' are aimed at lessening the
mismatch in developing countries between the high burden of disease and
the lack of technical capacity to make use of existing knowledge or to
generate new knowledge to address health problems. Another derivative
benefit is the provision of various forms of health care. For instance, post-
trial maintenance of a primary care clinic established in conjunction with a
study might be extremely beneficial to a host community. A final example
of a derivative benefit is a commitment from researchers to continue
working with a developing country (after a trial) to solve particular health
problems.
One advantage of derivative benefits is that significant aid can still be
provided to a host community when research is not expected to produce
an effective intervention for a number of years-for "only rarely does a
single research study lead to the discovery of a new intervention that can
be introduced promptly into routine care"' 9-- or when an experimental
intervention proves ineffective. This, in turn, may help lessen the
perception that the industrialized country is exploiting the developing
country. In addition, where research sponsors are either unable or
unwilling to make effective interventions available, capacity building may
provide a realistic, less costly alternative.
The benefits that are actually negotiated will depend upon a number
of factors. As mentioned, the health problem addressed by a research
protocol is one such factor. Will there be a need for the intervention once
the study is completed? Can the health problem be cured or is it a chronic
or terminal condition? What will be the cost of the intervention or other
benefit? The nature and number of sponsors responsible for providing the
intervention is also relevant. Is the sponsor, for example, a non-
governmental organization (NGO) or a pharmaceutical company?
Likewise, the conditions in a host country as well as its capabilities will
influence the agreement. One of the most important considerations in
every case is the host country's health care system. In poorer countries,
provision of an effective intervention would probably be appropriate in
most instances. The suitability of providing derivative benefits will depend
upon the nature of the benefit and the economic and technological state
" JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV / AIDS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HIV
PREVENTIVE VACCINE RESEARCH: UNAIDS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT Guidance Point 3 (2000)
[hereinafter UNAIDS] ("Strategies should be implemented to build capacity in host
countries and communities so that they can practise meaningful self-determination in
vaccine development, can ensure the scientific and ethical conduct of vaccine development,
and can function as equal partners with sponsors and others in a collaborative process.").
" NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 121.
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of a developing country. For example, technology transfer makes sense for
countries with strong local pharmaceutical industries (or countries that are
developing them), while building research capacity or obtaining
researcher commitments would be appropriate for many, if not all,
developing countries.
Whether it suffices to provide derivative benefits instead of an
intervention that has proven to be effective is a question that is, in itself,
extremely controversial. Some contend that it is ethical to conduct
research on a population that will not receive any direct benefit from that
research so long as that population is compensated in some other
important way, such as by increasing the host community's ability to
conduct research or constructing a water sanitation plant in a community
that lacks clean water. Others argue that the fruits of the research must
accrue directly to the population from which research subjects are drawn.
A. The Ethics of Conducting Research in Developing Countries
As mentioned, biomedical research conducted in developing countries
by industrialized countries must be responsive to the health needs and
priorities of the host community to be ethically acceptable. This
fundamental principle of international research ethics is well documented
in prominent international guidelines such as the CIOMS Guidelines2 0 and
the World Medical Association (WMA) Declaration of Helsinki.21 It also forms
the cornerstone of the NBAC report, Ethical and Policy Issues in International
Research: Clinical Trials in Developing Countries.2 The implementation of this
principle, however, is much more difficult. As former National Institutes of
Health Director Harold Varmus and former Surgeon General David
Satcher noted, "[o]ne of the great challenges in medical research is to
conduct clinical trials in developing countries that will lead to therapies
that benefit the citizens of these countries.
23
Some have argued that, to be ethically acceptable, research must "offer
the potential of actual benefit to the inhabitants'2 4 of a developing country
by providing host communities affordable access to an effective
intervention. It is not enough that the tested intervention is provided to
trial participants. Without guaranteeing affordable access to the
population from which participants are drawn, the developing country
20 CIOMS, supra note 8.
2 WMA, supra note 9.
22 1 NBAC, supra note 1, at 8.
" Harold Varrnus & David Satcher, Ethical Complexities of Conducting Research in Developing
Countries, 337 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1003, 1003 (1997).
24 Glantz et al., supra note 9, at 39.
111:1 (2002)
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receives little benefit. If the knowledge gained from research is used
primarily for the benefit of the industrialized world, the research may
rightly be characterized as exploitative and therefore unethical.2'5
Exploitation, as the term is used herein, refers to exploitation "in
execution, or in the final analysis," not intent. Even if researchers and
sponsors are well intentioned, "their research may nevertheless violate
ethical canons if its positive fruits are not made reasonably available to
former research subjects and other inhabitants of the host country., 26
The argument that research must benefit the host community can be
taken even further. Leonard Glantz and his colleagues argue that it is not
enough to make an effective intervention available to a host community by
removing financial barriers to access if there is no means of getting the
intervention to the population that needs it: "Where the health care
infrastructure is so undeveloped that it would be impossible to deliver the
intervention even if it were free, research would be unjustified in the
absence of a plan to improve the country's health care delivery
capabilities."2 7 Consistent with this argument, the CIOMS Guidelines declare
that "[e]xternal sponsors are ethically obligated to ensure the availability
of ... [health care] services that are a necessary part of the commitment of
a sponsor to make a beneficial intervention or product developed ...
reasonably available to the population or community concerned.
2 8
Although there are many explanations for conducting research in
developing countries, there are generally two sound reasons for doing so.
One is that no known effective intervention exists for a serious health
problem in a developing country. Research is the best method for
developing solutions to such health problems. The other reason arises
from the reality of health economics in developing countries. Developing
countries often lack the resources to purchase existing interventions. Many
of them may not be able to provide even the most rudimentary health care.
Under these circumstances, there are many experimental interventions
that should be tested precisely because they offer the promise of an
affordable, albeit perhaps imperfect alternative. The question of
affordability is extremely important in both scenarios. In either case, if the
intervention will be too expensive, its effectiveness is irrelevant. Because
'5 Crouch & Arras, supra note 9, at 26; Carlos Del Rio, Is Ethical Research Feasible in Developed
and Developing Countries?, 12 BIOETHIcs 328, 330 (1998); Glantz et al., supra note 9, at 39.
26 Crouch & Arras, supra note 9, at 30.
27 Glantz et al., supra note 9, at 41.
28 CIOMS, supra note 8, Guideline 21.
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such research will not benefit the host country, it should not be done.29
II. WHY PRIOR AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE USED IN INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL
TRIALS: A RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF PRIOR AGREEMENTS
Most stakeholders in the research enterprise would probably agree
that, at least in principle, the use of prior agreements is ethically desirable
and should be encouraged in international clinical trials. Prior agreements
can help researchers, sponsors, ethics review committees, host
governments, and other parties involved focus on whether the host
community will truly benefit from the proposed research. On a practical
level, however, a variety of individuals and organizations, primarily
researchers, research sponsors (both public and private), host
governments, and ethicists object to requiring prior agreements as a
condition for research approval. These criticisms, discussed below, have
most often arisen in the context of general discussions about such
agreements rather than in specific instances where the use of an
agreement was at issue.
A. Prior Agreements Delay or Prevent Research
One criticism of requiring prior agreements as a condition for
research approval is that it will only delay or prevent new drug research in
developing countries.0 Sponsors may be reluctant to commit financially to
providing effective interventions, which in turn might affect their
willingness to support research in developing countries. One response is
that, even if this is true, host populations lose nothing because the
research benefits would not be available to them anyway.3 ' In addition,
prohibiting research protects the host community against exploitation by
the industrialized world.
Moreover, the use of prior agreements and the advancement of
research beneficial to developing countries are not mutually exclusive
goals. First, to assume that all, or even most, effective interventions will
simply be distributed to developing countries free of charge is erroneous.
While it is true that a few countries cannot afford to buy interventions even
9 Leonard H. Glantz, Testimony Before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 150,
152-55 (Jan. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/transcripts/index.html#janO0.
'0 Glantz et al., supra note 9, at 41; Reidar K. Lie, Justice and International Research, in
BIOMEDIcAL RESEARCH ETHIcs: UPDATING INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES 27, 29 (RobertJ. Levine
et al. eds., 2000).
" Glantz et al., supra note 9, at 41.
111:l1(2002)
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at a subsidized cost, others can buy interventions as long as they are not
expected to do so at industrialized-world prices." Still others can be
licensed to produce the tested interventions.
Second, while in many instances, research sponsors will play a primary
role in providing effective interventions, this will not always be the case.
Normally, public agencies that sponsor research are too constrained
financially to make interventions available post-trial. However, when such
an obligation arises, public agencies become responsible for locating
another funding source for the intervention, such as an organization
involved in promoting health or development. Similar creative funding
arrangements may provide incentives for private industry to research
diseases occurring primarily in the developing world. By distributing
financial burdens more widely, the actual or perceived barrier to research
imposed by prior agreements can be reduced. Much-needed research can
move forward while, at the same time, developing countries are protected
from exploitation.
B. There Are Formidable Financial, Logistical, and Other Obstacles to Prior
Agreements
A second criticism is that, in practice, many aspects of prior
agreements can be extremely problematic.33 Affordability, distribution, and
appropriate product use must all be considered prior to conducting
" The pharmaceutical industry routinely claims that high drug prices are required to
finance the high cost of research and development as well as to compensate for research
failures and the large number of drugs that are never profitable. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 32; PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. ASS'N OF AM., 2002
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 20-23 (2002). However, the prices that industry insists
upon go well beyond what others believe to be necessary to prevent innovation from
suffering. For example, certain experts argue that industry devotes much larger shares of
each revenue dollar to marketing and paying CEO salaries and shareholder dividends than
to research and development. See, e.g., DONALD DRAKE & MARIAN UHLMAN, MAKING
MEDICINE, MAKING MONEY (1993); Alan Sager & Deborah Socolar, Affordable Medications for
Americans: Problems, Causes, and Solutions, Paper presented to the Prescription Drug Task
Force, United States House of Representatives, July 27, 1999, at 14-17, available at
http://www.nysenior.org/News/reports/affordable-medicines.pdf. Also, the United States
government has played a significant role in the research and development of drugs from
which industry ultimately profits, including several antiretroviral drugs used to treat AIDS.
See Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing and South African Health Policy:
Managing Confrontation with U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVICES 765, 767-
69 (1999); Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need To Reform, 17
AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 397 (1991); Margaret Duckett, Compulsory Licensing and Parallel
Importing: Background Paper, International Council of AIDS Service Organizations § 5, at
http://www.icaso.org/icaso/docs/compulsoryenglish.htm (July 1999).
" Lie, supra note 30, at 29.
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research. The UNAIDS Guidance Document identifies specific issues that
need to be addressed to ensure availability of an effective intervention,
including "payments, royalties, subsidies, technology and intellectual
property, as well as distribution costs, channels, and modalities, including
vaccination strategies, target populations, and number of doses.
''4
In certain cases, a host community may be hard to define. How and by
whom should that determination be made? Do the people of the host
country constitute the community? What if the research participants
represent populations that are not confined by national borders? What
about research participants from earlier trials that have some bearing on
product development? Does the obligation to provide the benefit extend
to these populations? Difficulties could also arise with respect to provision
of the intervention. Who should be responsible for providing it? What does
making the intervention "available" mean in a particular situation? Does it
mean for some designated period of time or for as long as the intervention
is needed? Will the intervention be provided free of charge or will there be
some nominal cost? If the latter, how will that cost be determined? If there
is agreement on these terms, parties still face equally difficult and
important concerns, such as implementation, treatment monitoring and
compliance, and general medical care for the community that will receive
the research benefit. Feasible plans must be developed and incorporated
into the prior agreement.
It is easy for critics to dismiss the use of prior agreements because
there are as yet no answers to some of these difficult issues. However, the
difficulties inherent in the negotiation and implementation of prior
agreements do not outweigh the ethical imperative to secure them. The
resolution of critical health problems always requires grappling with
complex and challenging issues, and the concerted efforts and talents of
multiple partners from diverse environments and disciplines are often
needed. Collaborative efforts are routinely employed to address drug
funding and / or distribution problems in developing countries in a non-
research context, such as a NGO purchase or a donation by a
pharmaceutical company. With a NGO purchase, it must be determined
whether a product will be distributed free of charge or, if not, what the
charge will be to a host country. With both NGO purchases and company
donations, decisions must be made regarding how and to whom drugs will
be distributed. These same types of problems can be resolved for
international clinical trials.
Negotiating prior agreements also requires parties to focus on
" UNAIDS, supra note 18, at 14.
111: 1 (2002)
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expected research benefits in a detailed and concrete way that helps
minimize delays in availability. There may be cases where those reviewing a
protocol, such as an institutional review board (IRB) / ethics review
committee or a country's ministry of health, know (or should know) that
an intervention will not be widely available in the host community after the
trial is completed. For example, an experimental drug might require
refrigeration, but a prospective host community may lack such storage
capability. Developing a plan for funding and distribution would bring that
fact to light. If the problem cannot realistically be overcome, parties would
need to reevaluate whether the trial can be conducted ethically. Whether
or not such availability issues prove insurmountable, there is no reason to
believe that they cannot be addressed before research begins, or that they
are somehow easier to address after a study is finished.
If obstacles to availability can be overcome, parties need to reach an
understanding on how a host community will actually benefit from
proposed research. A host country's entire population need not benefit
immediately, but sufficient numbers should benefit over a reasonable
period of time so that a meaningful contribution to the overall welfare of
the developing country or countries is evident. Debates over the CIOMS
Guidelines definition of "reasonable availability" have yet to produce a
precise resolution, so arriving at a definition that would satisfy everyone
remains a formidable challenge. There are, for example, questions about
the scope and content of "reasonable availability" as well as "about the
exactitude and stringency of the required prior assurances. 3 5 The
development of an internationally acceptable standard is, however, a
highly desirable goal that is of utmost importance to conducting ethical
research in developing countries and should continue to be a subject of
discussion. Ideally, such a standard should be broad enough to afford the
flexibility needed for a variety of cultural and moral contexts without
departing from the ethical principle that it embraces. The CIOMS
Guidelines acknowledge that "the issue of 'reasonable availability' is
complex and will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis,3 6 and
suggest several relevant considerations.
In the meantime, the use of prior agreements would permit case-by-
' Crouch & Arras, supra note 9, at 30.
36 CIOMS, supra note 8, Commentary on Guideline 10.
31 Id. (suggesting factors such as "the length of time for which the intervention or product
developed, or other agreed benefit, will be made available to research subjects, or to the
community or population concerned; the severity of a subject's medical condition; the
effect of withdrawing the study drug (e.g., death of a subject); the cost to the subject or
health service; and the question of undue inducement if an intervention is provided free of
charge").
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case determinations without first reaching a consensus on the difficult and
divisive issue of reasonable availability. Prior agreements may even facilitate
agreement by providing specific examples of successful or unsuccessful
benefit-sharing arrangements.
C. It Is Not the Prevailing International Standard
A third criticism of requiring prior agreements in international clinical
trials is that making effective interventions and other research benefits
available to host communities is not the prevailing international standard.
It is far from being universally accepted by researchers, sponsors, ethicists,
public health officials, politicians, industry, and others with an interest in
the research enterprise. 8
One response to this argument is that ethics is not about "what is," but
rather, "what ought to be."39 An ethical obligation to make effective
interventions available to host communities can be traced as far back as the
Belmont Report, which was issued in 1979 by the United States National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. In its discussion of the principle of justice and the
distribution of the burdens and benefits of research, the National
Commission touches indirectly upon the issue of making effective
interventions available to those populations upon which they were tested.
It states:
[W]henever research supported by public funds leads to the
development of therapeutic devices and procedures, justice demands
that these not provide advantages only to those who can afford them and
that such research should not unduly involve persons from groups
unlikely to be among the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the
research.40
The following international documents lend additional support for an
obligation to make effective interventions and other research benefits
Lie, supra note 30, at 29.
" Solomon R. Benatar, Justice and International Research: A Response to Reidar K Lie, in
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ETHICS: UPDATING INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES 41, 47 (RobertJ. Levine
et al. eds., 2000); Ruth Macklin, After Helsinki: Unresolved Issues in International Research, 11
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICSJ. 17, 20 (2001).
'0 NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
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available to host communities: the CIOMS Guidelines,4 the Declaration of
Helsinki,42 the UNAIDS Guidance Document,43 the WHO Operational Guidelines
for Ethics Committees that Review Biomedical Research,44 and the Ethics
Committee of the Human Genome Organisation Statement on Benefit-
Sharing.45 They all demand resolution of product-availability and benefit-
sharing issues before research begins. A number of them impose an
affirmative obligation to provide effective interventions to a host
community.
46
The UNAIDS Guidance Document was the first of its kind to focus
explicitly on resolving drug access problems as part of international clinical
trials. Not only does it insist on addressing availability before research
begins, but also, it identifies in general terms the parties who should be
41 CIOMS, supra note 8, Guideline 10 ("Before undertaking research in a population or
community with limited resources, the sponsor and the investigator must make every effort
to ensure that ... any intervention or product developed, or knowledge generated, will be
made reasonably available for the benefit of that population or community.").42 WMA, supra note 9, Principle 19. The latest revision of the Declaration of Helsinki contains a
new provision concerning the need for the accrual of some potential benefit to host
countries.
41 UNAIDS, supra note 18, Guidance Point 2 ("Any HIV preventive vaccine demonstrated to
be safe and effective ... should be made available as soon as possible to all participants in
the trials in which it was tested, as well as to other populations at high risk of HIV infection.
Plans should be developed at the initial stages of HIV vaccine development to ensure such
availability.").
"WORLD HEALTH ORG., OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ETHICS COMMITITEES THAT REVIEW
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (2000). The WHO Operational Guidelines, which "establish an
international standard for ensuring quality in ethical review," id. at 1, recommend that "a
description of the availability and affordability of any successful study product to the
concerned communities following the research" be considered as an element of review by
ethics committees. Id. 1 6.2.6.6.
5 HUMAN GENOME ORG. ETHICS COMM., STATEMENT ON BENEFIT-SHARING (2000). The Human
Genome Organisation (HUGO) is the international organization of scientists involved in
the Human Genome Project, the global initiative to map and sequence the human genome.
The HUGO Ethics Committee endorses the equitable distribution of the benefits of genetic
research. Its Statement on Benefit-Sharing which provides that "all humanity" share in the
benefits of genetic research, suggests that there be prior discussion with individuals and
communities about benefit-sharing and, more specifically, about "affordability and
accessibility of eventual therapy, and preventive and diagnostic products of research." Id. §
G. The most far-reaching provision in the Statement calls for for-profit entities engaging in
genetic research to donate a percentage of their annual net profit (e.g., 1%-3%) "to the
health care infrastructure or for vaccines, tests, drugs, and treatments, or, to local, national,
and international humanitarian efforts." Id.
,6CIOMS, supra note 8; NAT'L CONSENSUS CONFERENCE, GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF
HEALTH RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS IN UGANDA (1997); NAT'L HEALTH COUNCIL,
RESOLUTION No. 251 (1997) [hereinafter NHC RESOLUTION No. 251]; NAT'L HEALTH
COUNCIL, RESOLUTION No. 196/96 ON RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1996)
[hereinafter NHC RESOLUTION No. 196/96]; UNAIDS, supra note 18; WMA, supra note 9.
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part of that process and the relevant issues to consider. Guidance Point
Two states:
Any HIV preventive vaccine demonstrated to be safe and effective ...
should be made available as soon as possible to all participants in the
trials in which it was tested, as well as to other populations at high risk of
HIV infection. Plans should be developed at the initial stages of HIV
vaccine development to ensure such availability.
4 7
Parties "should include representatives from relevant stakeholders in the
host country, such as representatives from the executive branch, health
ministry, local health authorities, and relevant scientific and ethical
groups."4 8 Including host country representatives greatly improves the
chances that the values and culture of that country will be taken into
account. Others parties should include "representatives from the
communities from which participants are drawn, people living with HIV /
AIDS, and NGOs representing affected communities" as well as
"international organizations, donor governments and bilateral agencies,
representatives from wider affected communities, international and
regional NGOs, and the private sector."
4 9
In recent years, various provisions relating to post-trial benefits have
begun to appear in the ethics guidelines of several industrialized and
developing countries, including the United Kingdom, ° Canada,5 Nepal,52
Uganda,5  and Brazil. 4 The guidelines promulgated by the United
55 5Kingdom, Canada,6 and Nepal57 simply demand resolution of access
47 UNAIDS, supra note 18, at 13.
4 Id. at 14.
49 Id.
'0 MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE U.K, MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES: ETHICAL GUIDELINES OF
MRC-SPONSORED STUDIES (1999) [hereinafter MRC-UK].
51 MED. REsFxcH COUNCIL OF CAN. ET AL., CANADIAN TRI-CoUNcW PoLIcY STATEMENT, EThUCAL
CONDUCrFORRESEARCH INVOLVINGHUMANS (1998) [hereinafter MRC-CA].
52 NEPAL HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16.
5 NAT'L CONSENSUS CONFERENCE, supra note 46.
' NHC RESOLUTION No. 251, supra note 46; NHC RESOLUTION No. 196/96, supra note 46.
'5 MRC-UK, supra note 50, Specific Consideration 9 ("In anticipation of any beneficial
results of therapeutic research, there should normally be discussion in advance with
relevant parties in the developing society ... about subsequent availability of the relevant
product to local inhabitants.").
56 MRC-CA, supra note 51, Commentary to art. 7.2 (stating that the Research Ethics Board
should examine "the issue of continuing access after the trial").
"' NEPAL HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, app. III. The model checklist developed
for use by ethics review boards includes consideration of the "possibility of [the]
111: 1 (2002)
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issues before research begins without imposing any affirmative obligation
to make interventions available once a trial is completed. In contrast,
Uganda" and Brazil59 require more than just advanced discussions. In
many cases, ethics guidelines do not carry the force of law or no
mechanisms exist for effective enforcement. Nevertheless, in the future,
one might reasonably expect to see increasing numbers of international
and national research ethics guidelines embrace product-availability and
benefit-sharing obligations.
Indeed, there is increasing recognition of the need to make moral
progress in international research. Unlike before, there are efforts to
refine vague benefit-sharing provisions such as "reasonable availability," 60
"reasonable likelihood,, 61 and "a reasonable effort., 62 Accordingly, we must
rethink our ethical obligations and interpret them in ways that are
appropriate to the ever-changing environment in which clinical research is
conducted in developing countries. Today, private industry, rather than
government, sponsors and conducts the lion's share of international
research.63 Coupled with the global imbalance of power and disparities in
intervention (vaccine, drug, or supplementation) being available to the participants
population if found effective." Id.
" NAT'L CONSENSUS CONFERENCE, supra note 46, § V(D) (4). Uganda imposes an obligation
to provide interventions to research participants as well as to the host community, but
distinguishes the obligations owed to these two groups. It mandates:
The investigator must provide assurances that, if the investigational product is
found to be beneficial, the investigator will make every effort to ensure its
provision, without charge, to participants in the trial following the conclusion of
the trial. In addition, the investigator shall make a reasonable effort to secure the
product's availability to the local community in which the research occurred.
Id.
" NHC RESOLUTION No. 251, supra note 46; NHC RESOLUTION No. 196/96, supra note 46.
Research should "guarantee the individuals and communities where the research was
undertaken a return on the benefits obtained in the research." NHC RESOLUTION No.
196/96, supra note 46, § 111.3(n). Research participants must be ensured "the benefits
resulting from the research project, in terms of social return, access to procedures,
products or research agents." Id. § I1II.3(p). Still further, "in case of research conducted
abroad or with external cooperation" evidence "of commitments and advantages to the
research subjects and to Brazil, which will result from the implementation of the research"
must be submitted to the ethics review committee. Id. § 111.3(s). Finally, as part of the
research protocol, "[a] ccess to the medicine being tested must be assured by the sponsor or
by the institution, researcher, or promoter, if there is no sponsor, in the event its superiority
to the conventional treatment is proven." NHC RESOLUTION No. 251, supra note 46, §
IV.1 (m).
6 CIOMS, supra note 8.
61 WMA, supra note 9.
6' NAT'L CONSENSUS CONFERENCE, supra note 46, § V(D) (4).
63 Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, HEALTH ARr., May-Apr. 2000, at
129, 131.
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access to health care, the ethical obligation to engage in post-trial benefit-
sharing should extend beyond the publicly supported research envisioned
by the National Commission over twenty years ago. Although it is not the
prevailing international standard, the obligation to make effective
interventions available to host communities after a trial is over is still an
ethical standard to which we ought to aspire for all clinical research
conducted in the developing world. Approving protocols based on this
standard forces researchers and sponsors to be realistic about their reasons
for conducting research in a developing country.
D. Researchers Cannot Realistically Influence Health Policy
A fourth criticism is that requiring prior agreements as a condition of
research approval "would go far beyond the influence one can reasonably
expect of researchers concerning changes in a country's health policy."64 In
other words, how often would a developing country's policy change as a
result of research so that effective interventions will get to the people that
need it?
65
The answer to this question is "sometimes." One example from the
Nuffield Council report that illustrates the limited influence of researchers
to make effective interventions available is the iodination of salt to combat
goiter in Nigeria. In that case, it took the Nigerian Ministry of Health
fifteen years to act.66 However, another example from the Nuffield Council
report involving the use of nevirapine to reduce mother-to-child
transmission of HIV in Uganda is indicative of a study that successfully
influenced national health policy.
67
r4Lie, supra note 30, at 29.
r Alfred Sommer, Testimony Before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 155, 162-
68 (Sept. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/transcripts/index.html#sep99.
' NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 123. According to a Nigerian researcher
at Harvard University:
In 1975 a group of scientists led by the Chairman of the Nigeria Medical
Research Council presented research data to the Nigerian Department of Health
which revealed the high prevalence of goitre in the country. Attention was drawn
to the impact of iodine deficiency not only in causing goitre but also by reducing
the intellectual capacity of children born to iodine-deficient mothers. The group
urged the government to introduce iodination into the two salt factories in which
the government had investments. UNICEF had offered to cover the cost of
modifying the equipment to accommodate the iodination process.
Id.
67 Id. at 124. In this study, nevirapine was administered to HIV-infected pregnant women at
the onset of labor and to the babies within forty-eight to seventy-two hours after delivery.
The study showed that in the experimental arm, there was a fifty percent reduction in
111: 1 (2002)
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The problem, in most instances, is not the inability of researchers to
influence national health policy (or that developing countries are forced
into prior agreements that they do not want). Rather, it is that access to
effective interventions, which goes far beyond affordability, is an issue that
researchers, sponsors, IRBs, ethics review committees, and / or host
governments have either failed to address altogether or neglected to
address in sufficiently explicit and realistic terms. As Solomon Benatar
pointed out, "research considerations cannot be divorced from
considerations of health, and health cannot be divorced from the
economic and political considerations that affect health. ''18 These and
other related issues, such as the financing, delivery, and appropriate use of
interventions, must be considered during discussions on post-trial benefits.
Also, although researchers play an important advocacy role in the prior
agreement process, making effective interventions available cannot be the
sole province of researchers. It is crucial to involve sponsors, host
governments, host communities, international aid agencies, and other
interested parties.
There may be circumstances under which one or more of these parties
will not make a firm commitment until after research clarifies an
intervention's prospect of benefit, safety concerns, and the effectiveness of
alternatives. Testifying before NBAC, one international health researcher
noted:
[I]n a ... vaccine study in an[] African country .. the Health Ministry
resented the requirement that some commitment be made up front
feeling that that was a patronizing requirement and that they would be
able to make a commitment when they saw the results of the study and
could do an appropriate analysis of cost and benefit. And that gets to
some of the perceived paternalism and rigidity of the current
guidelines.69
Moreover, the results of a trial may strengthen the position of the host
country in negotiating with sponsors, manufacturers, and private
philanthropies.
transmission of HIV-infection from mother to child at fourteen to sixteen weeks compared
to the control group, which received only zidovudine (AZT). Laura A. Guay et al.,
Intrapartum and Neonatal Single-Dose Nevirapine Compared with Zidovudine for Prevention of
Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV-I in Kampala, Uganda: HVNET 012 Randomised Trial, 354
LANCET 785 (1999).
Benatar, supra note 39, at 41.
wJack Killen, Testimony Before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 115, 120
(Sept. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/transcripts/index.html#sep99.
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In the complex and uncertain environment in which research is
conducted in developing countries, a commitment to a continuing process
of discussion and negotiation about post-trial benefits, undertaken by the
parties before research begins, is the first step. During their initial
discussions about proposed research, developing countries should make
known to researchers their positions concerning availability of the
intervention or other benefits after the study is concluded. Assuming that a
developing country wants to ensure that an effective intervention will be
made available to its population at that time, a prior agreement can assist
in this effort through the development of a plan for implementation.
E. Prior Agreements Would Create a Double Standard with Regard to Clinical
Research Conducted in the U.S. and Other Industrialized Countries
A fifth criticism of using prior agreements for research conducted in
developing countries is that such a requirement creates a double
standard.'o However, the fact that use of prior agreements is not the
current ethical standard for industrialized countries does not justify a
similar practice elsewhere; it simply describes the existing state of affairs in
the industrialized world. Moreover, perhaps use of prior agreements in the
industrialized world is a goal that we should set to ensure that effective
interventions are available to those who need them. Whenever research is
conducted in populations with limited access to health care, justice
requires pre-trial consideration of post-trial access to effective
interventions.
F. Prior Agreements Can Always Be Breached
A final criticism is that parties might breach prior agreements.
71
Although breach is always possible, it does not justify rejecting the use of
prior agreements. Furthermore, the threat of debarment from future
research and ostracism by the international research community would
serve, in many cases, as an effective deterrent.7 Finally, depending on
whether there is general compliance with non-binding prior agreements,
parties may insist on legally binding documents with enforceable remedies.
III. PRIOR AGREEMENTS IN USE TODAY IN INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRIALS
Economic globalization and the Acquired Immunodeficiency
7
' NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 1, at 180.
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Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic have made the industrialized world more
acutely aware of the magnitude of health problems in developing countries
and the imbalance in the global burden of disease. These factors have
impressed upon us the need for moral progress and for reform of the
existing system that keeps the developing world in poor health and poverty
and impedes every aspect of its advancement. Increasingly, pre-trial
measures are being undertaken to make effective interventions and other
research benefits widely available in developing countries where research is
conducted. Different types of prior agreements employed by WHO, the
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), and VaxGen are discussed
below. WHO has successfully used prior agreements to make effective
interventions available in developing countries; the other two initiatives,
although promising, are newly developed and untested. These examples
were chosen because of the availability of a sufficient, although somewhat
limited, amount of information concerning the agreements themselves
and the context in which they're negotiated.
A. The World Health Organization (WHO)
WHO, the world's leading international health organization, is an
inter-governmental unit of the United Nations system. In conjunction with
its role "of harnessing support from among a variety of players to meet its
health development agenda,, 73 WHO collaborates with industry to promote
research and development of new health-related products and
technologies for prevention, diagnosis, control, and treatment of diseases
that are of priority to WHO. An essential element of these collaborations is
the negotiation of prior agreements to ensure that final products will be
made widely available to developing countries at low cost. WHO's partners
include pharmaceutical and biotech companies as well as manufacturers of
health-related instruments and equipment. In 2000, it was estimated that
WHO has employed well over a dozen prior agreements. 4
Generally, WHO cooperates with industry in two ways. First, it may
design, conduct, or fund studies, trials, and other development work on
proprietary industry products in which WHO expresses an interest and /
or is invited to collaborate. Second, it may license certain intellectual
property that it owns to industry for further development into a final
product, with or without technical or financial support. WHO usually
73 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO GUIDELINES ON INTERACTION WITH COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 2
(preliminary version July 1999) [hereinafter WHO COMMERCIAL GUIDELINES].
" E-mail from P.D. Griffin, Scientist, World Health Organization, to Alice Page, Senior
Policy Analyst, National Bioethics Advisory Commission (July 18, 2000) [hereinafter Griffin
July Email] (on file with author).
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acquires intellectual property through research performed by institutions
that it funds. However, such property is of little direct benefit to WIHO
because it lacks the facilities, resources, and "know-how" to further utilize
it.
Prior agreements between WHO and its industrial partners are
mindful of WHO's interest in ensuring that successful products are made
available to the public health sector (in particular, to the public health
sector of developing countries on preferential terms) as well as industry's
interest in obtaining a reasonable return on its investment. 75 The
agreements follow standard principles set forth in WHO's Policy on Patents
and its Guidelines on Interaction with Commercial Enterprises7 and are
negotiated on a case-by-case basis. As a result, their final terms and
conditions may differ depending on a variety of factors, such as ownership
of the intellectual property rights in question, the stage of a product's
development at the time of negotiations, and past and expected future
contributions to the collaboration by parties. The negotiations are then
memorialized in a legally binding document called a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). '
In all its collaborations, WHO requires that products and technologies
developed with WHO support will be made generally available to both the
public and to public sector agencies. The MOU defines "public sector
agency" as "a government, or a department or agency thereof, or a
recognized non-profit organization or entity, including the WHO and any
other organization within the United Nations system." 79 Agreements usually
provide that a product will be made available to the public either by the
industry partner or through a license to WHO if the industry partner
decides to abandon the project. The industry partner must further agree to
make a product available to public sector agencies of developing countries
"in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of such agencies" for
distribution in the public sector.0
In addition to quantity commitments, pricing commitments are also
sought. Pricing commitments obtained from industry partners may differ
depending on whether a product will be distributed through the private
sector. If distribution will occur through both the private and public
71 WORLD HEALTH ORG., POLICY ON PATENTS: INFORMATION PAPER ON WHO PATENTS POLICY §
2.3 (1985).
76 Id.
"WHO COMMERCIAL GUIDELINES, supra note 73.
71 WORLD HEALTH ORG., DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (1999) [hereinafter WHO
DRAFT MOU].
Id. § 15(a), at 6.
Id. § 6, at 3.
111:1 (2002)
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sectors, the price for public sector agencies "shall be (i) preferential
compared to the Private Sector price, and (ii) set at the lowest possible
level permitting a commercially reasonable return on combined worldwide
sales of the Compound for Distribution in both Public and Private
Sectors."" ' A product can be sold in the private sector at whatever price the
industry partner chooses. Pricing commitments from industry partners can
also take the form of "cost, plus a modest mark-up" or a maximum price,
depending on the circumstances."' "Cost, plus a modest mark-up" can be
used at any stage of collaboration, provided terms can be defined and
agreed upon. In contrast, a maximum-price commitment can only be used
if product development is at such a point that parties can determine what
it will cost to make a product.8 3 If a product will not be distributed through
the private sector, availability to public sector agencies shall be "at the
lowest possible, commercially reasonable price." 4 The same applies for
bulk purchases. To a much lesser degree, WHO may receive royalties that
are then invested in the public interest either to offset the cost of products
85or to fund further research to meet the needs of developing countries.
A final item that is negotiated in each case is the period of years for
which product availability is assured. Although there is no fixed time, "at
the end of the agreed period of time the company concerned must agree
to provide technology transfer to enable the country or countries
concerned to continue either to manufacture the product themselves or
through a sublicensing agreement to have somebody else manufacture it
for them.... 86
B. The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IA VJ)
LAVI is an international scientific, non-profit organization founded in
1996 with the single aim of accelerating the development of safe, effective,
and accessible HIV vaccines for global use. LAVI's research focus is on
vaccines for developing countries. Through the investment of what it calls
"social venture capital," IAVI's goal is to develop vaccines that "would be
Id. § 6(b), at 3.
' E-mail from P.D. Griffin, Scientist, World Health Organization, to Alice Page, Senior
Policy Analyst, National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Feb. 11, 2000) (on file with
author).
83 GriffinJuly Email, supra note 74.
84 WHO DRAFT MOU, supra note 78, § 6, at 3.
85 P.D. Griffin, Testimony Before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 111, 115 (Jan.
13, 2000), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/ranscripts/index.html#janO0.
86 Id. at 144.
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inexpensive to manufacture, easy to transport and administer, stable under
field conditions, and require few inoculations. , 87 IAVI is driven by the
belief that a vaccine represents the world's best hope to end the AIDS
epidemic.
In 1998, IAVI issued a Scientific Blueprint for AIDS Vaccine Development8
that links promising vaccine approaches with countries in which to test
them. IAVI seeks to accelerate product development and clinical trials
through public-private partnerships between vaccine developers,
manufacturers, and those who will test the vaccines. Because the epidemic
is most severe and the need for a vaccine is greatest in developing
countries, most of IAVI's efforts are focused there. These collaborations
seek to ensure that people in developing countries for whom particular
vaccines are designed benefit from those vaccines once they are developed.
To date, IAVI has invested $20 million to create six vaccine
development partnerships (VDPs) with individuals and entities from both
industrialized and developing countries. 9 It also contributes expertise "as
" Victor Zonana, Commonwealth Leaders Urge Greater Support for AIDS Vaccines, IAVI REP.
(International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, New York, N.Y.), Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 5, available at
http://www.iavi.org/reports/63/nov-dec-1999-4.html.
" INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, 1998 SCIENTIFIC BLUEPRINT FOR AIDS VACCINE
DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.iavi.org/about/98sblueprint.htm.
89 The first VDP, the Oxford / Kenya Partnership, is an academic partnership created in
1998 with the University of Oxford and the University of Nairobi to develop for East Africa
two separate vaccine constructs to be used in combination. Phase I clinical trials began in
Oxford in 2000 (now in Phase II) and in Nairobi in early 2001. IAVI's goal is to begin a
Phase III trial in East Africa by 2004-2005, assuming the vaccine continues to perform well.
INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, IAVI-SPONSORED AIDS VACCINE APPROACHES IN DEVELOPMENT
AND TESTING, at http://www.iavi.org/vaccinedev/pipeline.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter IAVI VACCINE APPROACHES]; INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, VIRTUAL COMPANY
MODEL: VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS, at http://www.iavi.org/vaccinedev/vdp.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter IAVI VDP]; 1 NBAC, supra note 1, at 105.
The other VDPs encompass a "second generation" of vaccines designed to address
"critical outstanding technical challenges." IAVI VACCINE APPROACHES, supra. The second
VDP, the Targeted Genetics / Children's Research Institute / South Africa Partnership,
formed in 2000, is with Targeted Genetics Corporation (TGC) of Seattle, Washington, and
the Children's Research Institute (CRI) in Columbus, Ohio. Its purpose is to develop a
vaccine for southern and eastern Africa. A vector technology developed by TGC will be
utilized to deliver HIV genes as a form of genetic immunization. TGC's manufacturing
process is based on a cell line originally developed by a researcher at CRI, which holds the
patent to the technology. The vaccine is designed to give longstanding protection from a
single dose and, therefore, may be particularly appropriate for areas where vaccine delivery
is difficult. Id.; IAVI VDP, supra; 1 NBAC, supra note 1, at 105.
The third VDP, the Institute for Human Virology / Uganda Partnership, also formed
in 2000, is with the Institute of Human Virology at the University of Maryland and the
Ugandan Ministry of Health. The vaccine under development uses genetically modified
Salmonella bacteria as an oral delivery system for DNA. The ease of delivery and extremely
111:1 (2002)
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needed, in areas ranging from project management to regulatory affairs
and infrastructure for clinical trials."90 IAVI's focus on industrial
participation in vaccine development is based on the belief that private
sector involvement and ingenuity are crucial. 9' LAVI has been instrumental
in structuring prior agreements with industry partners that give developing
countries access to IAVI-supported vaccines at reasonable prices and in
sufficient quantities. According to IAVI President Seth Berkley, "[d]ealing
with the access issue at the start of the process represents a wholly new
approach to vaccine development that will ultimately benefit both
industrialized and developing countries. ' IAVI's prior agreements with its
industrial partners call for reasonable pricing policies for the public sector
in developing countries. The public sector includes government health
agencies and not-for-profit organizations serving developing countries.93 In
return for financing the early stages of vaccine development, companies
agree to make a vaccine available to the public sector in developing
countries in quantities reasonable to demand and at manufacturing cost
plus a reasonable profit, which is defined. If companies do not comply,
IAVI retains the right to transfer the intellectual property and background
technology to another manufacturer. If manufacturing costs seem
unreasonable, IAVI can obtain alternative bids for production. If a third
low cost make this a very promising vaccine for large-scale field use. It is hoped that clinical
trials can begin in 2003 in Uganda and the United States. IAVI VACCINE APPROACHES, supra;
IAVI VDP, supra; 1 NBAC, supra note 1, at 105. The fourth VDP is with Therion Biologics
Corporation, the Indian Council of Medical Research, and the Indian Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare. The partnership is designed to develop vaccines for India as well as a
program for community participation and capacity building to conduct clinical trials in that
country. Therion will manufacture vaccine doses for early trials, then transfer the
technology to an Indian company for manufacture. IAVI VACCINE APPROACHES, supra; IAVI
VDP, supra.
The other VDPs are with (1) Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center and (2) Bioption
AB. IAVI VACCINE APPROACHES, supra.
oAVI VDP, supra note 89.
91 A successful AIDS vaccine will necessarily rely on technologies covered by new and
existing patents. Realistically, however, development of an AIDS vaccine by pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries alone is unlikely for four reasons. First, the development costs
of a vaccine are high. Second, a very large percentage of the potential vaccine market
probably will be in developing countries without resources to buy a vaccine. Third, because
of variation in the predominant viral strains in industrialized and developing countries,
vaccines may have to be country-specific. Fourth, the highly charged political issue of HIV /
AIDS presents a disincentive for vaccine development. Thomas C. Nchinda, Initiatives in
Health Research, in THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 121, 122 (Sheila Davey ed.,
1999).
12 Zonana, supra note 87.
" INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, DRAFr INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATIVE AGREEMENT para. 1 (b),
at 1 (1999).
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party can produce the vaccine at lower cost, the signatory company must
match that price or contract the third party for manufacturing. A vaccine
can be sold at market price in the industrialized world and in private
markets in the developing world. If an industry partner cannot meet its
overall obligations, IAVI retains the right to choose from several options to
ensure global accessibility. 9'
Investment in industry is not the only component of IAVI's strategy.
IAVI is also working with the World Bank on the creation of vaccine
purchase funds to provide additional financial incentives for industry to
engage in vaccine development. According to Berkley, vaccine purchase
funds are "mechanisms that can create a market in the developing world to
purchase these vaccines and to distribute them. The idea would be that
we-before the vaccine is ever made-would have a mechanism in place to
have the vaccines purchased., 95 The creation of purchase funds is based on
the notion that although companies should not lose money on the
vaccines they produce, the financial return that companies can expect
(and must be willing to accept) will differ according to the market in
question. The profit margin in the developing world would be next to
nothing; however, companies that are willing to deal in those markets
receive other important benefits, such as economies of scale and entrre
into those markets.
When asked if the types of agreements IAVI has forged will work in
other contexts, Berkley explained that he sees IAVI's quest for an AIDS
vaccine "as a chance to begin to develop the mechanisms that make sense,
that can be used across the whole range of different products. When we sit
down and compare the issues on malaria to HIV, they are not that
different."
97
In addition to updating its 1998 Blueprint with Scientific Blueprint 2000:
Accelerating Global Efforts in AIDS Vaccine Development,98 LAVI created another
blueprint, AIDS Vaccines for the World: Preparing Now To Assure Access.99 The
latter document "presents a strategy for addressing the many economic,
political, and logistical obstacles to immediate and widescale (sic) access in
94 Id. para. 9, at 5-7; INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, IAVI BAcKGROUNDER 2 (1999).
"' Seth Berkley, Testimony Before the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 271, 302-03
(Jan. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/transcripts/index.html#janOO.
9 id.
9' Id. at 308.
9
' INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, SCIENTIFIC BLUEPRINT 2000: ACCELERATING GLOBAL EFFORTS
IN AIDS VACCINE DEVELOPMENT (2000).
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the developing world" and seeks to avoid "the typical [ten- to twenty-year]
delay in introducing new vaccines to poor countries.... ,00 Most recently,
IAVI updated its research and development agenda for 2002 to 20041'1 and,
to achieve that agenda, created a "virtual vaccine company model"
consisting of VDPs, centralized laboratories and reagent production, large-
scale development and manufacturing partnerships, partnerships for Phase
III clinical trials in developing countries, and "core regulatory dossier
design." °2
C. VaxGen
VaxGen, a California-based biotechnology company, developed an
AIDS vaccine known as "AIDSVAX."'03 AIDSVAX is the first AIDS vaccine
candidate in the world to enter Phase III efficacy studies. VaxGen raised
money to finance its own trials in an effort to get the vaccine tested as
quickly as possible.1 0 4 Two trials are underway. The first is taking place in
the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Netherlands. Between June 1998
and October 1999, more than 5,400 participants were recruited, mostly
men who have sex with men. Bangkok, Thailand is the site of the second
trial. Recruitment of 2,500 participants, all intravenous drug users at high
risk of HIV infection, began in March 1999 and concluded in August 2000.
Primary results from the Thai study are expected later this year.105
Thailand was chosen as a study site for several reasons. One is the
strong professional relationship that has developed between key
"0 IA VI Releases Blueprints for Speeding Vaccine Development and Ensuring Access, IAVI REP.
(International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, New York, N.Y.), Sept.-Nov. 2000, at 9, available at
http://www.iavi.org/reports/103/IAVI_Blueprints3.htm. The Blueprint calls for the
following five steps: (1) "[d]evelopment of effective pricing and global financing
mechanisms"; (2) "[d]evelopment of mechanisms to reliably estimate demand for specific
vaccines and to ensure sufficient production capacity to meet initial demand for an effective
vaccine"; (3) "[d]evelopment of appropriate delivery systems, policies, and procedures for
the most at-risk populations, especially adolescents and sexually active adults"; (4)
"[h]armonization of national regulations and international guidelines governing vaccine
approval and use"; and (5) "[e]stablishment of a mass vaccination program in developing
countries for at least one under-used pediatric vaccine." Id. at 9.
"' INT'L AIDS VACCINE INITIATIVE, THE TAVI RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 2002-2004,
http://www.iavi.org/pdf/rd-agenda.pdf (July 2002).
102 IAVI VDP, supra note 89.
103 Bill Snow, VaxGen: Pushing the Envelope, in HIV VACCINE HANDBOOK: COMMUNITY
PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATING IN RESEARCH, ADVOCACY, AND PROGRESS 195, 197 (Bill Snow
ed., 1999).
104 Id. at 199.
0
5 VAXGEN, OUR VACCINE CANDIDATES: VAXGEN CLINICAL TRIALS, at
http://www.vaxgen.com/vaccine/trials.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
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individuals at VaxGen and Thai researchers. '°6 Another reason is that the
HIV virus strains present in Thailand are homogeneous, making it easier to
test AIDSVAX.' 7 Finally, WHO and UNAIDS supported the building of
infrastructure to conduct vaccine trials, and UNAIDS and the United
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have supported
cohort development over a number of years. A cohort of intravenous drug
users from methadone clinics run by the Bangkok Metropolitan
Association was first compiled, from which research participants were
subsequently recruited for the vaccine trial.'08
The Thai government, the Bangkok municipal government, and
Mahidol University have been very proactive in working with VaxGen.
Despite the implementation of other interventions, Thailand has one of
the fastest growing rates of HIV infection in the world, and the
government has made the development of an AIDS vaccine a health
priority.'0° As a condition to hosting the study, the Thai government
required, first, that any vaccine tested in Thailand have a reasonable
likelihood of preventing infection by the particular strains of HIV most
prevalent in the country. VaxGen specifically developed AIDSVAX B/E to
prevent further infections by the two viral subtypes, B and E, that are
prominent in those infected through sexual exposure and intravenous
drug use."0 The Thai government also required that the country receive
research benefits in two forms: the product itself and capacity building."'
In its discussions with the Thai Ministry of Public Health, VaxGen
informally agreed that, should there be a licensed product, the country
would receive special treatment from the company in making the product
available in Thailand."' Specifically, VaxGen agreed to make a concerted
effort to decrease the cost of the vaccine for Thailand. If feasible, because
Thailand has a strong local pharmaceutical industry, arrangements could
be made for bulk shipment of the vaccine with filling and finishing in
Thailand." 3 One Thai AIDS researcher described this arrangement as a
.0 E-mail from Marlene Chernow, Vice President of Product Development and Regulatory
Affairs, VaxGen, to Alice Page, Senior Policy Analyst, National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter Chernow E-mail] (on file with author).
' Esparza, supra note 12, at 10; Chernow E-mail, supra note 106.
... Esparza, supra note 12, at 9; Chernow E-mail, supra note 106.
'0 Esparza, supra note 12, at 2, 6, 10; Chernow E-mail, supra note 106.
"
0 Esparza, supra note 12, at 9; Chernow E-mail, supra note 106.
,. Chernow E-mail, supa note 106.
"' E-mail from Donald Francis, President, VaxGen, to Alice Page, Senior Policy Analyst,
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"letter of intent" and the first of its kind for any vaccine trial in the world."4
Discussions on how to make the vaccine available after study completion
are ongoing. Although there is a formal agreement governing the Phase III
study itself, the Thai government has requested nothing beyond the "letter
of intent" for making the product available.
Many of the benefits that will accrue to Thailand take the form of
capacity building. Thai researchers highly value the transfer of such
knowledge and technology, which is occurring in three ways as the result of
a verbal commitment between VaxGen and Thailand, not as part of the
"letter of intent."' 5 First, VaxGen is transferring its data management
capabilities to Thailand. A complete data center has been established so
that Thai researchers have state-of-the-art hardware and software. VaxGen
is also teaching the Thai data management unit how to collect, monitor,
and validate data to comply with international clinical research guidelines.
Second, the company has developed a repository of laboratory specimens.
Thai researchers are learning how to store, track, locate, and connect data
to specimens. Third, VaxGen is training Thai researchers in clinical
research and good clinical practices for conducting Phase III trials.
Thailand's previous experience has been limited to Phase I and II trials.'
1 6
Overall, the goal is to enable Thailand to function independently and
conduct Phase III trials on its own.
In 2000, several allegations were published in the Washington Post
concerning post-trial benefits sought by Thailand for either research
participants or the country itself that VaxGen would not agree to
provide.1 1 7 First, VaxGen allegedly refused to pledge care for research
participants who become HIV-positive during the trial. Thai health
authorities finally agreed to provide the best local therapy, which is far less
effective than what subjects would receive if the trial were carried out in
the United States. Second, VaxGen allegedly refused to guarantee that its
vaccine, if proven effective, would be sold to Thailand at a reduced price:
"A 'gentlemen's agreement' the company wrote in 1998 to Thai health
officials suggested that if the Thais helped with packaging the vaccine,




However, according to VaxGen's President, the company "can't give (the)
14 Thailand: From "Guinea Pig" Fears to Phase III Trial: An Interview with Natth Bhamarapravati,
IAVI REP. (International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, New York, N.Y.), Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 6-7,
available at http://www.iavi.org/reports/75/sep-oct-1999-6.html.
"5 Chernow E-mail, supra note 106.
16 Esparza, supra note 12, at 4; Chernow E-mail, supra note 106.
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vaccine away and bankrupt the company."1 9 Finally, VaxGen purportedly
rejected Thailand's requests for profit sharing or for a manufacturing
plant to be located in the country. One Thai representative who reviewed
the study and is now a member of the Thai Senate said, "[W] e were
making test subjects available and we were agreeable to that. But on the
other hand, we did not have that much bargaining power. Our situation
was desperate.' 20 VaxGen has invested almost $600,000 in equipment and
facilities that will remain in Bangkok when the study is over.
12 1
CONCLUSION
Many opportunities and challenges remain for the use of prior
agreements in international clinical trials. Some agreements, such as those
employed by WHO, have proven successful. Agreements forged by other
entities such as IAVI and VaxGen await the judgment of time. What
conclusions about prior agreements can be drawn from these examples?
Because they are limited in number, and specific factual information about
them and the contexts in which they were negotiated is scarce, it is difficult
to extract general principles concerning the use of prior agreements in
international clinical trials. However, several observations are in order.
It may be important to distinguish, at least in some cases, between
situations where a developing country is a party to a prior agreement and
those where a developing country, although not a party to an agreement, is
its ultimate intended beneficiary. Out of necessity, industry is very likely to
play a prominent role in most, if not all, of these arrangements. However,
the presence of a third party acting on behalf of, or in conjunction with, a
developing country may be critical to the successful negotiation of benefits.
WHO and IAVI have been able to secure fair pricing agreements from
industry for the sale of study interventions to developing countries. To
what can their success be attributed? Perhaps most importantly, these
organizations have strong ties to the industrialized world and have entered
into research collaborations on behalf of developing countries. WHO is a
powerful, well-established international health organization headquartered
in Europe, while IAVI, although a relatively new company based in the
United States, is becoming increasingly well-funded by major donors such
as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the





122 IAVI VACCINE APPROACHES, supra note 89.
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Furthermore, WHO and IAVI have more experience than many
developing countries in negotiating agreements to develop and distribute
health care goods and services collaboratively. In addition to economic
resources, they possess (or can purchase) the scientific, medical,
technological, business, and legal know-how that developing countries may
lack. These organizations utilize legally enforceable contracts in their
collaborative partnerships.
In contrast, some developing countries are simply unaware of the
possibility of obtaining post-trial benefits through prior agreements. Those
that negotiate prior agreements may find themselves severely
disadvantaged by inequities in bargaining power. These inequities may
become especially problematic when a developing country negotiates
directly with industry without the assistance of a third party. Because help
from the industrialized world is needed to combat AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and other diseases that are ravaging their populations, developing
countries might accept arrangements that are far less than what
distributive justice 123 requires. In VaxGen's case, such a small company may
not be financially positioned to subsidize all the benefits Thailand
requested.1 24 Yet, larger and wealthier sponsors still may not have agreed to
Thailand's demands.
Two further observations, also drawn from the VaxGen example, relate
to the capacity-building benefits provided to the Thai government. First,
the importance of securing such benefits should not be underestimated.
Although the provision of successful interventions may help developing
countries address particular health problems in the short term, building
research capacity better situates developing countries to solve their own
health problems in the long run. Second, capacity building in the VaxGen
case is proceeding solely on the basis of a verbal commitment. This attests
to the importance of the strength of the relationship between collaborative
partners and their mutual commitment to the goal of the collaboration.
Finally, while the use of prior agreements in international research is
in its infancy and, with a few exceptions, remains largely idealistic, prior
agreements show great promise as a way to prevent exploitation of
developing countries and of the individuals who serve as research subjects.
The endorsement of such agreements in international and national ethical
guidelines is a step forward. However, even if the problems inherent in
123 See supra note 2.
'2' That VaxGen was unwilling to provide state-of-the-art treatment for research participants
who became HIV-infected during the trial is not surprising. The high cost of such treatment
in AIDS vaccine trials makes this issue one of the most contentious in international research
ethics today.
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their interpretation and enforcement can be overcome, their widespread
use in international collaborative research should be anticipated with
cautious optimism. Many human rights treaties, for example, have been in
existence for decades and yet, acceptance of, or adherence to, those
treaties is far from universal. Only ongoing discourse and debate can
persuade individuals and organizations that prior agreements should be
used in international research. 2 By no means do prior agreements provide
a perfect solution, but, as is always the case, solutions to difficult and
complex problems must begin somewhere.
125 CIOMS' recent draft revision of its research guidelines directly endorsed prior
agreements and defined the term. COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. Scis., DRAFT REVISION
OF THE CIOMS INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS Guideline 6 (2001). This was the first time the term "prior agreement"
appeared in international research ethics guidelines. However, in the final version, that
provision was eliminated after what must have been a lively and controversial discussion that
is likely to be repeated again and again.
111:l1 (2002)
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